Wednesday, November 27, 2019

THIS IS NOT A DRILL Dont blame the button presser, blame the button designer

THIS IS NOT A DRILL Dont blame the button presser, blame the button entwurferTHIS IS NOT A DRILL Dont blame the button presser, blame the button designerOn Saturday morning, people living in Hawaii faced a false-but-terrifying nuclear threat after an employee at the Hawaii Emergency Management Agency erroneously sent a public emergency alert that read BALLISTIC MISSILE THREAT INBOUND TO HAWAII. SEEK IMMEDIATE SHELTER. THIS IS NOT A DRILL to peoples smart phone devices, causing widespread panic and fear for the 38 minutes it took for Hawaii authorities to correct the error.How could such a massive error have happened? According to the Washington Post, the unidentified employee saw two options in a drop-down menu on a computer program - Test missile alert and Missile alert - and incorrectly picked the latter option of a real-life threat, which triggered alerts to the publics smartphone devices and television screens.Design failure, not menschenfreundlich error, to blameThe employee r esponsible for the push alert failure has reportedly been reassigned but not fired. Instead of blaming the person who pushed the wrong button, the government blamed the state system that allowed one person to have so much power. Based on the information we have collected so far, it appears that the government of Hawaii did not have reasonable safeguards or process controls in distributions-mix to prevent the transmission of a false alert, FCC Chairman Ajit Pai said in a statement on Sunday.User interface expert Don Norman said the error is the incompetent design in the alert system that allowed it to occurIn 2003, Norman wrote an oft-cited essay on how system failures within organizations too often get attributed simply to human error, which allows the errors to continue to occur unexamined.If we assume that the people who use technology are stupidthen we will continue to design poorly conceived equipment, procedures, and software, thus leading to more and more accidents, all of whi ch can be blamed upon the hapless users rather than the root cause - ill-conceived software, ill-conceived procedural requirements, ill-conceived business practices, and ill-conceived design in general, Norman wrote. It is far too easy to blame people when systems fail.Under this logic, yes, humans can cause errors, but more attention and responsibility should be paid to the processes in place that led to such an error.When a contractor can disable the presidents accountNormans philosophy can be applied to another recent incident of one workers mistake causing an outsized impact. In November, social media company Twitter blamed a contractor on his last day for disabling President Trumps Twitter account for 11 minutes.In a later interview, the contractorBahtiyar Duysak explained that his action was a mistake because he never thought the account would actually get deactivated, according to TechCrunch.The New York Times reported that Twitter employees had long expressed concerns that h igh-level accounts like those belonging to the U.S. president were too easily accessible for hundreds of the companys workers. By having a procedure that allowed for contractors like Duysak to access them, a system failure was more likely to occur.The nuclear threat triggered by a dropped socket wrenchThis is not the first time a nuclear situation has been caused by a human error facilitated by a flawed system. In 1980, two airman were performing maintenance on a U.S. Air Force Titan II ballistic missile in Arkansas when a socket wrench was accidentally dropped into the shaft of the missile silo. The socket hit a fuel tank and caused a missile explosion that lifted a warhead out of the ground and caused two peoples deaths.If the warhead had actually detonated, the maintenance mishap could have made part of the state of Arkansas uninhabitable and countless lives would have been lost. The safeguards for such a fluke event were not in place. As one of the technicians in the missiles co ntrol room put it, an accident like this wasnt on the checklist.If the system worked properly, someone dropping a tool couldnt send a nuclear warhead into a field, Eric Schlosser, who wrote a book on the Air Force incident, said in a PBS documentary.These examples show us that blaming a person is easy when an error causes headlines and panic. Whats more important, designers like Norman argue, is making sure the problem gets fixed so that mistakes and fluke events cannot be repeated by someone else.

Friday, November 22, 2019

A Racket for Engineers

A Racket for Engineers A Racket for Engineers A Racket for EngineersWatching professional tennis now compared to 30 years ago, its hard to even compare. Thats because at times its hard to even, well, see the ball. The increased speed of serves and ground strokes is undeniable and, though shot technique has changed and improved, its clear that racket improvements are at the forefront of what changed the game forever.And with more than a billion people playing tennis worldwide, theres much money to be made in continued improvement. Dr. Tom Allen, lecturer in engineering design at the Centre for Sports Engineering Research, Sheffield Hallam University, UK, has actually made a career out of analyzing what makes a stronger racket. In fact, his PhD welches sponsored by Prince, among the most recognizable companies in all of tennis products.I got into this because I liked the idea of mixing tennis and engineering in terms of applying finite analysis, he says. Im constantly looking at number s based on programs and also seeing players in action. Improvements never end.But where did the growth in racket technology, which led to the lightning-fast game we see today, really start? Its been a slow transition, Allen says. It started with wooden rackets, then laminated, then reinforced around the throat and, of course, the Howard Head and the Dunlop Max 200G.The Howard Head model brought on an increase in racket head size, allowing players to get to balls theyd otherwise fall short of, while the Dunlop had greater control because you could precisely place materials, Allen says. Remember the wood by contrast would only give so much, Allen offers. If, for example, you made a racket skinnier to reduce stiffness do that enough and it would break.Allens biggest contribution to the sport came much later. We were able to show the influence of friction on tennis strings wasnt like people thought, he says. They conceived that as you increase the friction of the surface you get more s pin, but our experiments demonstrated that lower friction actually is what does this, and I believe youve seen this change rackets across the board It was the result of a model. Its an advantage over an experiment because you can go right through to impact and measure what happened.Research can be intensive, as the friction conclusion took more than six months, but Allen continues to refine his methods. We use high-speed video to see what the player likes based on the video of them playing and then go to the step of creating a racket, he says. We used to not do that and that meant a much higher chance that the players wouldnt like what we made.Racket manufacturers today can use graphite, fiberglass, and still more options, making for different levels of flexibility and weight. And they still have engineers like Allen that wont stop tinkering. Even after you look at the speed of the ball, he says, you can look at adjusting rackets to limit injuries, so many areas. I know I wont run out of things to research anytime soonEric Butterman is an independent writer.I got into this because I liked the idea of mixing tennis and engineering in terms of applying finite analysisImprovements never end.Dr. Tom Allen, lecturer in engineering design, Centre for Sports Engineering Research, Sheffield Hallam University

Thursday, November 21, 2019

How to File an Article 138 Complaint Under the UCMJ

How to File an Article 138 Complaint Under the UCMJHow to File an Article 138 Complaint Under the UCMJArticle 138 is one of the most powerful rights under the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ), but it is one of the rights least known and least used by military personnel. Under Article 138 of the UCMJ, any member of the armed forces who believes himself (or herself) wronged by his (or her) commanding officer may request redress. If such redress is refused, a complaint may be made, and a superior officer must examine into the complaint. Article 138 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) gives every member of the Armed Forces the right to complain that he or she was wronged by his or her commanding officer. The right even extends to those subject to the UCMJ on inactive duty for training. Matters appropriate to address under Article 138 include discretionary acts or omissions by a commander that adversely affect the member personally and are In violation of law or regulati onBeyond the legitimate authority of that commanderArbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretionClearly unfair (e.g., selective application of standards) Procedures for Filing Complaint Within 90 days (180 days for the Air Force) of the alleged wrong, the member submits his or her complaint in writing, along with supporting evidence, to the commander alleged to have committed the wrong. There is no specific written format for an Article 138 complaint, but it should be in normal military letter format, and should clearly state that it is a complaint under the provisions of Article 138 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice. The commander receiving the complaint must promptly notify the complainant in writing whether the demand for redress is granted or denied.The reply must state the basis for denying the requested relief.The commander may consider additional evidence and must attach a copy of the additional evidence to the file. If the commander refuses to grant the requeste d relief, the member may submit the complaint, along with the commanders response, to any superior commissioned officer who is mandated to forward the complaint to the officer exercising General Court-Martial Convening Authority (GCMCA) over the commander being complained about. The officer may attach additional pertinent documentary evidence and comment on the availability of witnesses or evidence, but may not comment on the merits of the complaint. Special Note Article 138 clearly states that complaints may be addressed to any superior commissioned officer. However, only the Air Force regulations allow the complainant to bypass their chain of command when filing a complaint. The Army requires that the complaint is filed with the complainants immediate superior commissioned officer. A complaint in the Navy or Marine Corps must be submitted via the chain of command, including the respondent. Before reaching the general court-martial convening authority, an intermediate officer to wh om a complaint is forwarded may comment on the merits of the complaint, add pertinent evidentiary werkstoff to the file,andif empowered to do sogrant redress. In the Air Force, the complainant may submit the claim directly, or through any superior commissioned officer to the general court-martial convening authority. GCMCAs Responsibilities Conduct or direct further investigation of the matter, as appropriate.Notify the complainant, in writing, of the action taken on the complaint and the reasons for such action.Refer the complainant to appropriate channels that exist specifically to address the alleged wrongs (i.e., performance reports, suspension from flying status, assessment of pecuniary liability). This referral constitutes final action.Retain two complete copies of the file and return the originals to the complainant.After taking final action, forward a copy of the complete file to the Secretary of the Service (i.e., Secretary of the Army, Secretary of the Air Force, ect.) , for final approval/disposition. The GCMCA is prohibited from delegating his or her responsibilities to act on complaints submitted pursuant to Article 138. Matters Outside the Scope of the Article 138 Complaint Process Acts or omissions affecting the member which were not initiated or ratified by the commanderDisciplinary action under the UCMJ, including nonjudicial punishment under Article 15 (however, deferral of post-trial confinement is within the scope of Article 138)Actions initiated against the member where the governing directive requires final action by the Office of the Secretary of the ServiceComplaints against the GCMCA related to the resolution of an Article 138 complaint (except for alleging the GCMCA failed to forward a copy of the file to the Secretary of the Service) Complaints seeking disciplinary action against anotherSituations where procedures exist that provide the individual notice of an action, a right to rebut, or a hearing and review by an authority s uperior to the officer originating the action. (This includes most administrative boards)